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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Were the lower courts correct in ruling that the statute 
of limitations for tax titles was inapplicable? 
2• Was the statutorily required element of payment of taxes 
for a seven-year period to ripen adverse possession waived by 
this Court in Park West Village v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 
1986)? 
3. Was the Utah Marketable Record Title Act applicable in 
this case to either parties1 claim of superior title? 
4. May one who fails to prove all of the necessary elements 
for adverse possession obtain all of the attributes of ownership 
through the doctrine of prescriptive easement. 
5. Is Park City Municipal Corporation liable for the 
independent acts of a known third party. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Velma Marchant, Elma Winterton, Leora Robinson, Wanda 
Penrod, Mona Lichty and Merle Anderson (hereinafter collectively, 
"Plaintiffs"), brought a quiet title action in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Summit County (Case #7174) against Park City 
Municipal Corporation (hereinafter "Park City") and the State of 
Utah (hereinafter "State") claiming title to the parcel of real 
property in dispute (hereinafter "subject property") under 
alternate theories of superior title, adverse possession, 
1 
prescriptive easement or boundary by acquiescence. Plaintiffs 
also sought damages from Park City for the destruction of the 
shack on the property. 
After the trial on May 6, and 7, 1987, the Third District 
Court, Hon. Leonard H. Russon presiding, issued a memorandum 
decision2 and thereafter entered judgment3 quieting title in the 
State and dismissing with prejudice all of Plaintiffs' claims to 
the subject property and for damages. Plaintiffs appealed the 
Trial Court's judgment to the Utah Supreme Court (Case No. 
870320). Pursuant to Rule 4A, RUSC, the Supreme Court 
transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals (Case No. 
880131-CA). 
The Court of Appeals issued its unanimous Opinion4 on March 
13, 1989, affirming in whole the decision of the Trial Court. 
The petition for Certiorari followed. 
STATEMENTS OF FACT 
1. Subject Property, Title and Chain of Conveyances, 
(a) State's Chain of Title 
The subject property, which is described in Plaintiffs' 
Boundary of acquiescence was dismissed by the trial court 
granting Park City's partial motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs did not appeal on this issue. 
2
 Memorandum decision is reproduced as Exhibit 2 of Appendix. 
3
 Judgment along with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
are reproduced as Exhibit 3 of Appendix. 
4
 Reported as 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, reproduced as Exhibit 1 
of Appendix. 
2 
complaint, is a parcel of real property in Summit County located 
in Park City. The chain of title through which the State claims 
ownership of the subject property through the following 
documents, all of which were recorded, and all, except numbers 3, 
4, and 5 contained a metes and bounds description which included 
the subject property (Ex. 25) : 
1. A patent from the United States government, containing 
the property in question, to George Snyder on April 5, 1882. 
(Exhibit 27.) 
2. A deed from George Snyder to the Park City Smelting 
Company, dated November 14, 1883. (Exhibit 28.) 
3. A deed from the Park City Smelting Company to Lewis H. 
Withey and Clay H. Hollister on September 21, 1912. The deed did 
not contain a metes and bounds description, but described the 
conveyed property as "all of the real property or rights or 
interest in real property belonging to the Park City Smelting 
Company and situated in the County of Summit, Utah." (Exhibit 
29.) 
4. A deed from the executors of Lewis H. Withey's estate to 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company on November 5, 1926. The 
deed did not have a metes and bounds description, but conveyed 
"all the estate, right, title, interest, property, claim and 
demand whatsoever of the said Lewis H. Withey . . . [of] the 
property above described." (Exhibit 30.) 
5. A trustee's deed from Clay Hollister, Witheyfs tenant in 
common, to Silver King Coalition Mines on February 18, 1927. The 
deed did not contain a metes and bounds description but described 
the property as "all other real property or rights or interests 
in real property . . . belonging to Park City Smelting Company, 
and situated in the County of Summit, State of Utah." (Exhibit 
31.) 
6. A deed from Silver King Coalition Mines Company to 
United Park City Mines Company, dated May 8, 1953. (Exhibit 32.) 
7. A deed from United Park City Mines Company to Park City, 
dated April 2, 1969. (Exhibit 33.) 
8. A deed from Park City to the State of Utah, dated June 
7, 1982. (Exhibit 34.) 
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(b) Plaintiffs1 dee ds 
The Plaintiffs offered four deeds as evidence of their 
purported cha :i n of ti tie, The deeds are, as follows : 
1. A quit claim deed from Dai i ai id Belle McPolin to J esse 
McCarrell dated March 19, 1906, for "that certain one-story 
framed, three-room, dwelling house situated on the easterly side 
of Silver Creek and about 100 feet easterly from, the liimberyari 
of the Summit Lumber Company." (Exhibit 4.) 
2 , A qui t claim deed 1 r om Si immit County to M - o L ; 
[ s ic ] dated June 10, 1 9 3 4 , for !|I 2 8 68 for " [ i ] mprovcmcuts East 
U.C."Tracks, Park City, I Jtah ' (Exhibit 5.) 
3. A quit claim, deed from Summit County to William Rolfe 
dated June 21, 1917, for $1.00 for "that certain frame dwelling 
house by Lumber Vard in Park City, Summit County, Utah, assessed 
to William ? — ^ ;- *-•— -ear 1912." (Exhibit S. < 
4. A tax ae.j .it J;: • . . jlte dated 
June 1'. 1963. fc~~ '* ' ^ ^- . ' r 7.) 
cxt,:usic Evidence Regarding Deeds 
Plaintiffs did n.-t introduce ^rv exnrinsic evidence 
: <cept 
that said deeds were found among family ana leg a.. . ..- - Tr, 34, 
36). There was no evi dence as to the location J: the property 
.he Cou; -\ Auditor Fe<r 1 TN e, »\ -executed *V 1963 deed 
(Ex. - b-^;f ^ Summit County -.*- • •'- - Summit County 
;
 t ^ . I I - , I l}-||:| f 
testified that m e lyoi ra- *> . executed iz\ ^ : n v^s a de—i 
solely tn Improvement- ~ r * property - - - -
 ; deed tc ••- -. 
pi openly* Mi .:. . o.i_, t;:e grantee, had 
purposely not paid taxes DP, the same improvements "irder to 
o b t a i n .m deoc l I I'OIITI Suinin > r • 
4 
title. (Tr. 183-184.) 
Both Mr. Pace and Deputy Summit County Assessor Steven 
Martin testified that it was a common practice for Summit County, 
both currently and in the past, to assess real property and 
improvements constructed upon the real property separately if the 
improvements and underlying property were separately owned, (Tr. 
179-180, 200-201). Mr. Pace also testified that if taxes became 
delinquent on the separately owned improvements, it was the 
practice of Summit County to treat the improvements like real 
property and sell the improvements at tax sale and issue a tax 
deed, (Tr. 189-190), and that when improvements were sold at the 
tax sale, the intent of Summit County was to convey only the 
improvements and not the underlying real property, (Tr. 182). 
3. Possession and Abandonment of Subject Property by 
Plaintiffs 
All possession by Plaintiffs1 claimed predecessors ceased 
when the shack was abandoned in approximately 1964, (Tr. 66-67). 
Plaintiffs never possessed the subject property, (Tr. 65-66). 
From 1964 until this action was brought in 1982, the subject 
property was abandoned by Plaintiffs. The shack was vacant and 
appeared to be abandoned, the yard was unkempt and overgrown with 
weeds, and there was no discernible property use according to all 
four witnesses, including one of the Plaintiffs, who testified to 
have observed it, (Tr. 66-67; 109-110; 217-218; Vol. 2 P. 6). 
Park City building official, Ron Ivie, a certified building 
inspector with 2 3 years experience, (Tr. 108-9), testified that 
5 
when he Inspected the shack on the subject property in lr>Hi, i t 
.iippei'jred abandoned nnl ilnl in I ippe.ii i I In nn (III , mm mn wds 
attempting to rehabilitate ill i I i , lu'*-l 10) , 
Taxation of Subject Property 
that according *: c- records : rne ;iJi:ir:t County Assessor's 
%ff: *e, beginninc • ^ % z b^?* 1 rr To-rv r^;;i he 
.. . oummit County 
Assessc . records do ; r contai a locatable legal descripzi i\ 
-^ ,r- . . ,; ;_ ..-.. i^ iA^ wiv-- .: tr.*.
 s ^ owiinrary 
and testimony cf Mr. Martin snowed that from 1'< K * taxes 
for a n r c e i c 
subject property ^cie nssesou, j,.i *. *it= SUte'b 
predecessor- . - - interest. Silver King Coalir, -*r^ Mine^ .'nnp^ry ~-,d 
that i .=-.--- -
assesses ici ^..uveiisti.us, jnu i.-n sa, i M x e s were paid, 7r. 
.10 3-5) (Ex. 4 3) (Erf, H. I 
i rnm l'*1 i" 
property were assessed * k- tate ' s predecessor . r* - I.UN 
Miner :oi?pary ;* - l ian^I * f fer^r.t lc?al d e s c r i p t i o n wmoh 
. . :v~ i. - ^ . , every 
year :r I •,*>;. From ,*36~> tc t:,e present *. * ^  ^  
were oaid ~ * -- - abject properrv reca*:- * * ;wnr-r~ 
. . . /.atv ,. .[, .,J, .
 t =. present, 
(Tr. 2 06) . 
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Ed Osika, Vice President, Secretary-Treasurer of United Park 
City Mines Company testified that according to the records of 
United Park City Mines Company, it paid the real property taxes 
assessed to the United Park City Mines Company against the 
subject property for the year 1953-1969, (Tr. 167-169). Records 
of such tax payment were admitted as Exhibit 35. 
The only evidence of payment of any taxes by the Plaintiffs, 
or any of their predecessors, was the testimony of Plaintiff 
Merle Anderson. Ms. Anderson only had knowledge of payment in 
1982 and two years prior to 1982, (Tr. 69), and she had no 
knowledge of payment of taxes prior to 1966 (Tr. 70). The 
Plaintiffs introduced no records of testimony from the Summit 
County Assessor's office and Deputy Assessor, Steve Martin, 
testified that he had no knowledge of any payment of taxes by the 
Plaintiffs or their predecessors, (Tr. 212). 
5. Destruction of Shack on Subject Property 
No evidence was admitted that Park City had any involvement 
in the destruction of the shack on the subject property other 
than to issue a demolition permit to a third party. 
The Park City Fire Marshall/Chief Building Official, Ron 
Ivie, who is responsible for abatement of dangerous structures 
which are public nuisances testified that Park City did not 
destroy the shack on the subject property, (Tr. 198). Mr. Ivie, 
also testified that a demolition permit for the shack on the 
subject property was issued to Lloyd Brothers Construction, (Ex. 
38) (Tr. 94), and the shack was demolished to the best of his 
7 
knowledge by Lloyd Brothers Construction, which was not working 
for Park City and was employed by a third party, (Tr. 93). 
Mr. Ivie also testified that the procedure for issuance of a 
demolition permit does not require the applicant to prove 
ownership of the property (Tr. 96), but is issued upon the 
signature of the applicant that the applicant has the right to 
demolish the structure. 
Ross Lloyd, an owner of Lloyd Brothers Construction, 
testified that he was familiar with the demolition of the shack 
on the subject property, (Tr. Vol. 2 Pg. 2). Mr. Lloyd testified 
that the Lloyd Brothers Construction installed a water line 
through the subject property for Deer Valley Resort Company and 
that Deer Valley Resort Company and not Park City ordered the 
shack on the subject property demolished. (Tr. Vol. 2 Pg. 5) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY RULED THAT SPECIAL 
TAX TITLE STATUTE OP LIMITATIONS IS 
INAPPLICABLE. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the special tax title 
statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5.1, (1986), as 
amended, does not apply when a taxpayer fails to pay taxes when 
due and subsequently obtains a tax deed. (Court of Appeals 
decision, p. 4). To allow the taxpayer to strengthen his title 
by such an action is an abuse of the property taxation system. 
This was clearly the holding in Dillman v. Foster, 656 P. 2d 974, 
979 (Utah 1982). Dillman at 979 cited Crofts v. Johnson, 6 Utah 
8 
2d 350, 313 P.2d 808 (1957) for its holding that: 
This court has recognized the generally 
accepted principle that one who is under a 
duty to pay taxes cannot shirk that duty and 
then take advantage of it by purchasing the 
land at tax sale, and that if he does so it 
will not strengthen his title. 
The Utah Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court 
in concluding that the four-year statute of limitations for tax 
sale properties found in Utah Code Annn. §78-12-5.1, (1987), does 
not apply. First, Plaintiffs claim through a 1906 non-tax deed. 
Subsequent tax deeds from Summit County do not, pursuant to 
Dillman, entitle Plaintiffs to the special tax title statute of 
limitations.5 Second, William Rolfe (whom the Plaintiff-
Appellants "claim through" was not a record titleholder to the 
real property. The Court of Appeals recognized the practice of 
Summit County to assess separately improvements and real 
property.6 Even if Rolfe obtained quitclaim deeds after paying 
delinquent taxes, the most he would have received is title to the 
improvements described in the deeds. (Court of Appeals decision, 
pp. 4-5). To limit the conveyance to the deed description is 
consistent with the holding in Harman v. Polter, 592 P.2d 653 
(Utah 1979), that a description in a deed is prima facie evidence 
The 1917 tax deed to William Rolfe states that taxes had 
previously been assessed to William Rolfe (Ex. 6), and Reed Pace 
testified that Charles Rolfe had purposely failed to pay taxes to 
obtain the 1963 deed. 
6
 This Court also recognized the practice of Summit County to 
separately assess real property & improvements and treat 
improvements like real property in Park West Village, Inc. v. 
Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986). 
9 
of what is to be conveyed. 
The Plaintiffs, and not the Court of Appeals, have greatly 
misinterpreted the holding in Dillman. Dillman is controlling 
law, as the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals so found. 
Even if the tax debtor was in possession of the property, the 
failure to pay the taxes when due clearly does not entitle 
Plaintiffs to the protection of the special tax title statute of 
limitations as against third-party record titleholders. 
The application of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5.1 (1987) urged by 
Plaintiffs is undoubtedly unconstitutional. In Mennonite Board 
of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983), the United States 
Supreme Court held that a tax foreclosure and sale was void for 
denial of due process7 when all of the lienholders did not 
receive actual notice. Subsequently, the Third Circuit in Benoit 
v. Pathaky. 780 F.2d 336 (3rd Cir. 1985) held that the failure to 
give the required notice was a jurisdictional defect and rendered 
a tax title statute of limitations, like §78-12-5.1, Utah Code 
Ann., 1987, as amended, inapplicable. There was no evidence 
submitted before the trial court that the State's predecessors-
in-interest received any notice of the foreclosure proceedings 
precedent to issuance of a tax deed. In fact, clearly, United 
Park City Mines Company had no notice of the 1963 tax sale (which 
really only related to the improvements anyway) since it paid 
Due process of law is guaranteed both by 5th and 14th 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, §7 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
10 
taxes on the underlying real property both before and after the 
issuance of the 1963 tax deed to Charles Rolfe. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT RELIEVED FROM PROVING ALL 
STATUTORY ELEMENTS OF ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
Plaintiffs wrongly contend that Park West Village v. Avise, 
714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986), somehow relieves them from compliance 
with the statutory elements for adverse possession. This simply 
is not the holding in Avise. 
Plaintiffs argue that they obtained title to the property, 
inter alia, by adverse possession. In Utah, adverse possession 
is statutory. The elements necessary to prove adverse possession 
are found in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-7 to 21, (1987). The 
statutory elements of adverse possession are: 
1. Possess land in a statutory manner, for the statutory 
period of seven years; 
2. Hold the land adversely to the title owner; 
3. Pay all taxes legally assessed for the seven year 
period of possession. 
The party claiming adverse possession "has the burden of 
pleading and proving full compliance with the statute." 
Homeowners1 Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160, 166 
(1943) reaffirmed Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979). In 
1987, this Court held: "One who seeks to acquire title to real 
property other than by conveyance must comply precisely with the 
statutory elements for doing so." United Park City Mines v. 
Estate of Clegg, 737 P.2d 173 (Utah 1987). (Emphasis added.) In 
11 
order to prevail on adverse possession Plaintiffs had the burden 
of proving precise compliance with all of the statutory elements. 
Plaintiffs simply failed to identify or prove any seven-year 
period where they, or their predecessors, paid taxes legally 
assessed against the land or improvements. Payment of taxes for 
the seven year period is an indispensable element without which 
adverse possession cannot be shown, Dudley, supra. 
Furthermore, purchasing improvements at a tax sale, the only 
claimed payment by Plaintiffs or their predecessors prior to 
1931, does not qualify as payment of taxes for adverse possession 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-12-12, Utah Code Ann., (1987), 
Bowen v. Olsen. 2 Utah 2d 12,268 P.2d 983 (1954). 
Despite Plaintiff's claim, Avise does not relieve Plaintiffs 
from their burden of proving payment of taxes for the seven year 
period. The holding in Avise was that if the only taxes assessed 
are those on the improvements then payment of the taxes on the 
improvements for seven years, coupled with the other elements of 
adverse possession, will ripen the adverse possession. In Avise 
the successful adverse possessor had paid all taxes assessed for 
a period of 23 years. Similarly, in Royal Street Land Co. v. 
Reed, 739 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1987), the successful adverse possessor 
paid all taxes assessed on the surface estate or improvements for 
a period of seventeen years. Plaintiffs cannot point to a single 
instance where the continuous 7-year period for payment of taxes 
was waived by this Court. The Court of Appeals properly dis-
tinguished the instant action from Avise. (Ct.App.Dec. pp. 5-6.) 
12 
POINT III 
COURT OP APPEALS PROPERLY RULED THAT MARKETABLE RECORD 
TITLE ACT IS INAPPLICABLE TO PLAINTIFFS 
Plaintiffs assert in their petition that the Utah Marketable 
Record Title Act, (hereinafter the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. §57-9-1 
through 10, 1986, as amended, insulates their "title" from 
challenge by Park City or the State of Utah. This is based upon 
a total misreading of the Act. In fact, the Act insulates the 
title that was obtained by Park City and conveyed to the State. 
The Act requires "an unbroken chain of title of record to 
any interest in land for forty years or more. . .". §57-9-1, 
Utah Code Ann. (1986). (Emphasis added.) An unbroken chain of 
title is defined in §57-9-1 as when the recorded conveyances 
relied upon create an interest in (1) the person claiming such 
interest, or (2) some other person from whom, by one or more 
conveyances or other title transactions of record, such purported 
interest has become vested in the person claiming such interest. 
The root deed that Plaintiffs rely upon is a deed to William 
Rolfe from Summit County in June 1917. There are no subsequent 
conveyances from William Rolfe to anyone else, including the 
Plaintiffs. As indicated above, the Marketable Record Title Act 
requires a continuous chain of title for at least 4 0 years. 
Plaintiffs clearly cannot meet this requirement to invoke the 
Act. Secondly, there are recorded conveyances in State's chain 
of title in 1926, 1927, 1953, 1969, and 1982, which purport to 
divest Plaintiffs of any interest in the subject property. 
13 
It is entirely fallacious for Plaintiffs to be challenging 
the District Court decision and the affirming thereof by the Utah 
Court of Appeals by relying upon the Marketable Record Title Act, 
because the Act protects the title obtained by Park City and 
conveyed to the State of Utah, since none of Plaintiffs deeds 
contain a locatable description. 
The State has more than forty years of continuous record 
title which should be protected by the Act from by the challenge 
of the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Utah Court of Appeals properly 
affirmed the trial court decision by not granting the Plaintiffs1 
relief under the Act. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS CANNOT OBTAIN ATTRIBUTES OF OWNERSHIP 
BY CLAIMING AN EASEMENT 
Perhaps the most novel of the claims by Plaintiffs is the 
claim to a prescriptive right to the subject property which they 
failed to obtain title by deed, adverse possession or boundary by 
acquiescence. Plaintiffs would have this court rule that if a 
person seeking adverse possession fails to establish all of the 
elements for adverse possession, he may obtain all of the 
attributes of ownership by prescriptive easement. 
Both the trial court and court of appeals recognized the 
fundamental and fatal flaw in Plaintiffs1 position. Plaintiffs 
would have this Court so blur the universally recognized 
distinction between fee title ownership and easement as to make 
such terms interchangeable. Not only would such a ruling render 
14 
statutory elements necessary to ripen adverse possession 
meaningless, but it would also ignore hundred of years of Anglo-
American common law development which recognizes important 
distinctions between fee title and easements. 
The Court of Appeals, in dismissing Plaintiffs1 prescriptive 
easement claim, cited North Union Canal Co. v. Newell, 550 P.2d 
178 (Utah 1976), where this Court recognized and upheld the 
important differences between an easement and fee title. 
Similarly, Colorado in Osborn & Claywood Ditch v. Green, 673 P.2d 
380 (Colo. 1983), refused to allow misuse of the doctrine of 
easements to dispossess the fee owner. 
As authority, Plaintiffs cite only Zollinger v. Frank, 110 
Utah 514, 175 P.2d 764 (1946), However, Zollinger is a 
traditional use easement case and does not support the 
Plaintiffs1 desire to misapply the easement doctrine to obtain 
all of the attributes of fee ownership, i.e., right to 
exclusively maintain a house and yard. 
POINT V 
PARK CITY IS NOT LIABLE FOR 
DESTRUCTION OP THE SHACK 
Plaintiffs contend that Park City somehow has liability for 
the actions of a third party. Despite Plaintiffs1 
misrepresentation of the record,"Park City did not have "Deer 
Valley Resort bulldoze Plaintiffs' home so that the new road to 
Deer Valley could be built across this lot." (Plaintiffs1 brief, 
Pg. 9.) The only involvement of Park City in the destruction of 
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the shack was the issuance of a demolition permit . The 
demolition permit was issued to Lloyd Brothers Construction which 
was not working for Park City but for Deer Valley Resort. 
Building and demolition permits are issued by Park City on the 
representation of authorization by those procuring the permit. 
As legal authority for this novel claim that Park City is 
liable for the independent acts of third parties Plaintiffs only 
cite Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1987). In Ault the 
Court found that a tenant is liable for damages by unknown 
vandals which occur to property while it is under the tenant's 
possession and control. The facts of the instant matter are 
inapposite. Park City was not the tenant of the Plaintiffs and 
in fact, Plaintiffs claimed at trial that they and not Park City 
were in possession of the shack when it was torn down. Finally, 
the shack was not torn down by vandals but by an entity that is 
known to Plaintiffs, who Plaintiffs simply failed to sue. 
The relevant law controlling this situation was enunciated 
by the Court in Rolfe v. Village of Falconer, 4 67 N.E.2d 516 
(N.Y. App. 1984). In Rolfe damages were sought from the village 
because it had issued a permit. The Court held that the village 
had no duty to ascertain if the permittee was authorized by the 
owner and the Village had no liability for the actions of the 
Permittee. The facts in the instant matter are identical to 
Plaintiffs admitted at trial that they were asserting no 
claim for destruction of the shack against the State of Utah. (Tr. 
Vol. 2 P. 14.) 
16 
Rolfe. And the Court of Appeals correctly applied the law to the 
facts. The Utah Court of Appeals, by affirming the trial court, 
accepted its position in regard to the destruction of the subject 
home. This is clear from page 1 of the Utah Court of Appeals 
decision where it states that "Accordingly, they claim 
entitlement to $20,000.00 in damages for the destruction of the 
residence on the property. We affirm." Plaintiff-Appellants 
have failed to establish any error by upholding the trial court's 
finding that Park City is not liable for the issuance of a 
properly applied for demolition permit. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. The 
Court of Appeals properly decided all of the issues raised by the 
Plaintiffs in said petition. 
The four-year statute of limitations for tax deeds is 
clearly inapplicable since Plaintiffs cannot strengthen their 
title by their failure to pay taxes and a subsequent purchase at 
a tax sale. 
The Utah Court of Appeals' decision was consistent with Park 
West Village, Inc. v. Avise. 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986). In this 
case, unlike Avise, the Utah Court of Appeals properly noted that 
there was insufficient evidence that the Plaintiffs' predecessors 
had paid taxes on the property for seven continuous years and 
that there was evidence of a property tax assessment on the land 
as well, which was proven to have been paid by other parties such 
as the Silver King Coalition Mines Company. 
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The Utah Marketable Title Act is not applicable in this 
case, where record title is not continuous for at least forty 
years. In fact, the Act protects the title of the State. 
Notwithstanding the above issues raised by the Plaintiff-
Appellants, there are other matters that the trial court decided 
and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed which support the overall 
decision that title be quieted to the State of Utah. No notice 
of claim, as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah 
Code Annotated §63-30-1, et. seq. (1986), was filed against the 
State of Utah. Therefore, the matter was dismissed as against 
the State, which was an indispensable party. Additionally, §78-
12-5, Utah Code Annotated (1987), states that: 
No action for the recovery of real property 
or for the possession thereof shall be 
maintained, unless it appears that the 
plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or 
predecessor was seized or possessed of the 
property in question within seven years 
before the commencement of the action. 
The District Court and the Utah Court of Appeals, by affirming, 
found that Plaintiffs did not meet this seven-year statute of 
limitation. 
Plaintiffs attempt to persuade this Court that the future 
decision in Sweeney Land Company v. Kimball, Supreme Court No. 
880485, certiorari granted March 23, 1989, may necessitate review 
of the subject case. Upon reviewing the Sweeney Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari and the brief in opposition thereto, the 
issues raised therein are not relevant to the subject case. 
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Based on the foregoing, we respectfully request that this 
Court deny the subject Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I (J^ day of May, 1989. 
WHEATLEY & RANQUIST 
CRA*G SMITH 
or*igy_s__fbr Defendant-
espondent Park City 
Municipal Corporation 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
R. PAUL? VAN Di 
BY 
ALAN S. BACHMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent State of Utah 
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Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme 
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v. • tited Mhales Mail Sei''1 • U:H, postage prepaid, to Robert 
Felton, Attorney for Plaintiff, at his address of record, on this 
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Appellants challenge the trial court's ruling that tlm-i 
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.ants, ) OPINION 
(For Publication) 
In August of 1981, Park City issued a demolition permit 
to Deer Valley Resort to remove a building. The building was 
demolished by Lloyd Brothers Construction Company between 
August 4 and September 7 of 1981 allegedly to build an access 
road Deer Valley Resort- Appellants brought this action 
seeking to quiet title to the real property and to recover 
damages for the destruction of the home located on the property. 
According to appellants, their grandfather, William 
Rolfe, possessed the home and yard on the property from 1910 
until his death in 1939. After his death, his wife continued 
to occupy the property until 1946, She died in about 1949. 
William Rolfe's son, Charles Rolfe, rented out the house from 
1949 until about 1964. Charles Rolfe died in 1966 and his 
wife, Ethel Rolfe, died in 1981. Charles Rolfe*s daughters, 
appellants, claim to have visited the property at least once a 
year since 1964. In support of their claim that they have 
vested title to the property, appellants rely on the following 
documents: 
1. A quit claim deed from Dan and Belle McPolin to Jesse 
McCarrell dated March 19, 1906 for "that certain one-story 
framed, three-room dwelling house situated on the easterly side 
of Silver Creek and about 100 feet easterly from the lumberyard 
of the Summit Lumber Company.* 
2. A quit claim deed from Summit County to William Rolph 
[sic] dated June 10, 1914 for $28.68 for "[improvements East 
U.C. Tracks, Park City, Utah." The quit claim deed states that 
the deed is "made from title secured from a tax sale in the 
year 1909 and by an Auditors deed to Summit County, dated May 
1st, 1914." 
3. A quit claim deed from Summit County to William Rolfe 
dated June 21, 1917 for $1.00 for "that certain frame dwelling 
house by Lumber Yard in Park City, Summit County, Utah, 
assessed to William Rolfe in the year 1912." 
4. A letter from the Summit County Treasurer to Charles 
Rolfe dated May 16, 1957 stating that in 1938 the county issued 
a quit claim deed to Charles Rolfe9s father. The letter also 
stated that from 1940 to 1954, taxes were taken care of by 
widows abatement and that Charles Rolfe paid taxes of $8.06 in 
1955 and $7.33 in 1956. 
5. A tax deed from Summit County to Charles Rolfe dated 
June 13, 1963 for "House in lumber yard," stating "[t]his 
conveyance is made in consideration of payment by the Grantee 
of the sum of $12.53 delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and 
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c o s t s , c o n s t i t u t i n g i «I1UILJ*< ag.t " > Il estate ton the 
year 1958 i n the sura ot $7,fl1.* 
il i State ul Utah claims chain of title through a series 
of document's, all of which were recorded, and all, except 
numbers 3, 4 and 5 below, contained a metes and bounds 
description of th^ property. The documents are as follows: 
1, A patent from the United States government, 
undisputedly containing the vtovf- *y in question, to George 
Snyder on April 5, 1882 
2. A deed from George Snyder it, » the Park City Smelting 
Company, dated November 14, 1883. 
3. A deed from the Park city Smelting Company to Lewis 
H. Withey and Clay H. Hollister on September 21, 1912. The 
deed did not contain a metes and bounds description, but 
described the conveyed property as "all of the real property or 
rights or interest in real property belonging to the Park City 
Smelting Company and situated in the County of Summit, Utah." 
4, A deed from the executors of Lewis H. withey's estate 
to Silver King Coalition Mines Company on November 5, 1926. 
The deed did not have a metes and bounds description, but 
conveyed "all the estate, right, title, interest, property, 
claim and demand whatsoever of the said Lewis H. Withey . • • 
[of] the property above described." 
A trustee's deed fr on Clay Hollister", Withey1 s tenant 
in common, to Silver King Coalition Mines on February 18, 
1927. The deed did not contain a metes and bounds description 
but described the property as "all other real property or 
rights or interests in real property . . . belonging to Park 
City Smelting Company, and situated i n the County of Summit-
State of Utah.' 
6. A deed from Silver King Coalition Mines Company to 
United Park City Mines Company, dated May 8f 1953. 
7. A aeed from Unit Company to Park 
City, dated April 2, 1969. 
8 . A deed i i inn i iii i i i in i i i in mate ot U i a h , d a t e d 
June 7 , 1982 . 
There was no evidence that anyone other than William 
Rolfe paid taxes on the property until 1931. From 1931 to 
1953, the real property in question was assessed as part of 
Silver King CnaiiHnn Mines Company. From 1954 to 1969, real 
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property taxes were assessed to and paid by United Park City 
Mines, 
The trial court found that appellants' chain of title was 
discontinuous and, at best, conveyed title to improvements on 
the property only. The court concluded that the State's claim 
to title of the property was superior to that of appellants 
and, therefore, quieted title in the State of Utah and 
dismissed appellants9 complaint. 
On appeal, appellants assert that: 1) the trial court 
erred in finding that they did not have vested title to the 
property by deed or adverse possession; 2) even if appellants 
do not have title to the property, they established 
prescriptive use; 3) respondents are barred from challenging 
appellants* tax title by the statute of limitations set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 (1987); and 4) respondents' 
claims are barred by laches and estoppel. 
Vested Title 
Appellants first claim on appeal that the trial court 
erred in concluding they did not have vested title to the 
property by deed. Appellants assert they obtained tax title to 
the property by virtue of the 1914 quit claim deed and the 19 63 
tax deed from Summit County, and any action challenging that 
title is barred by the four year statute of limitations set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 .(1987). In addition, they 
claim title under the Marketable Record Title Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-9-1 through -10 (1986), commencing with the 1917 quit 
claim deed as the "root" of title. The trial court concluded 
that the tax deeds under which appellants claimed title did not 
convey title to the underlying real property. 
In reviewing the trial court's conclusions of law, we 
apply a correction of error standard with no deference to the 
trial court. Creer v. Valley Bank and Trust Co«# 97 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 12, 12 (Dec. 9, 1988). A person who has a duty to pay 
taxes cannot fail to pay taxes and subsequently purchase the 
land at a tax sale and thereby attempt to strengthen his title 
to the property. Dillman v. Foster. 656 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah 
1982); Crofts v. Johnson. 6 Utah 2d 350, 313 P.2d 808, 810 
(1957). In addition, one who has a tax deed but does not hold 
title to the property cannot assert the special statute of 
limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 (1987). 
Dillman. 656 P.2d at 978-79. 
In this case, there is no indication that William Rolfe 
was the record titleholder. Even assuming he received quit 
claim deeds from Summit County in 1914, 1917 and 1957 after 
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paying delinquent taxes, we agree with the trial court that, .„«! 
most, he received title to the improvements described in \ hv 
deeds* The 1963 tax deed# similarly, conveyed only the 
improvements, not the underlying real property. Taxes at that 
time were apparently separately assessed on improvements and 
real property in Summit County, and the State1s predecessor in 
title, United Park City Mines, paid real property taxes from 
1954 to 1969. The deeds did not strengthen Rolfe's title to 
the property, but merely indicated that he paid delinquent 
taxes on the property. The Statefs title, on the other hand, 
while flawed, is clearly superior to that of appellants 
Therefore,, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
concluding that appellants failed to establish title to the 
property by deed and that the tax deed statute of limitations 
was inapplicable. 
Appellants' second assertion o£ errc* ~ tne tciai 
court erred in finding that appellants did not have title to 
the property by adverse possession. The proponent of an 
adverse possession claim has the burden of proving full 
statutory compliance, including the payment of all taxes ; 
and assessed. Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah 
1979) . However, if a party in possession of property and his 
predecessors have paid taxes based on the value of improvement.;; 
on the property and no taxes have been levied based on th* 
valuation of the land, the party has established title to the 
property by adverse possession if all other elements of adverse 
possession are met. Park West Village. Inc. v. Avise. 714 P.2d 
1137, 1140-41 (Utah 1986); see also Roval Street Land Co, v. 
Efifii, 739 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Utah 1987), 
In Avise, the trial court found that Mrs. Lake faiie(j to 
acquire title to property because she failed to pay taxes on 
the property. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, stating that 
the trial court's finding that Mrs. Lake failed to pay taxes on 
the property was contrary to the evidence.. The court noted 
that an employee of the Summit County assessor's office 
testified at trial that he had searched the records in that 
office and could find no evidence that any taxes had been 
assessed on the land prior to 1975. The undisputed evidence 
established that Mrs. Lake received a tax notice every year and 
paid the tax that was levied. Although those taxes were based 
only on the value of the improvements on the property, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that because no other taxes were levied, 
Mrs. Lake had "paid all taxes levied and assessed" in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-12 (1977), The court 
also noted that there was no evidence that there were any 
delinquent taxes owing on the land for the years prior to 1 
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or that the land had been sold by the County for failure to pay 
taxes for those years. 
Appellants claim that this case is indistinguishable from 
&vi&£. We disagree. In MiS£# unlike this case, Mrs. Lake 
established that she had paid taxes on the improvements to the 
property for twenty-three years. In this case# however, the 
only evidence that appellants* predecessors had paid taxes on 
the property for seven continuous years were quit claim and tax 
deeds and a letter from Reed Pace to Charles Rolfe. There was 
no evidence that taxes were paid prior to delinquency. At 
best, the deeds and letter indicate that William Rolfe paid 
delinquent taxes on the personal property at various tax 
sales. Further, appellants established that Charles Rolfe paid 
taxes on improvements on the property in 1955, 1956 and 1958, 
but it was also proven that real property taxes were paid by 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company those same years. Thus, 
unlike Avise, appellants failed to prove that they paid taxes 
on the home or on the underlying land for a continuous seven 
year period. £g£ Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7.1 (1987). Payment 
of delinquent taxes at a tax sale cannot be used to establish 
the payment of taxes necessary to a successful claim of adverse 
possession. Otherwise, anyone purchasing property at a tax 
sale would be able to claim the number of years taxes had gone 
unpaid as a credit on the seven year period required for 
adverse possession. In addition, in contrast to Avise. the 
quit claim deeds themselves establish that taxes were assessed 
and not paid during the years appellants claim to have 
established title by adverse possession. Therefore, we hold 
that appellants failed to sustain their burden of proving 
payment of taxes for the requisite seven year period, and the 
trial court correctly concluded that appellants did not acquire 
the property by adverse possession. 
Prescriptive Easement 
Appellants also assert that even if they do not have fee 
title to the property by adverse possession or chain of title, 
they have a prescriptive easement. Appellants are unclear as 
to what they claim flows from the alleged prescriptive 
easement. If they claim that a prescriptive easement, if 
established, would give them ownership rights in the underlying 
property, they err. S&& Osborn & Cavwood Ditch Co, v. Green. 
673 P.2d 380, 382 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983). A prescriptive 
easement does not result in ownership, but allows only use of 
property belonging to another for a limited purpose, licnih 
Union Canal Co, v. Newell, 550 p.2d 178, 179 (Utah 1976). A 
prescriptive easement "arises under our common law from a use 
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of the servient estate that is 'open, notorious, adverse, and 
continuous for a period of 20 years, "• Crane v. Crane, 683 
P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah 1984) (quoting Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 
150, 152 (Utah 1981)). The trial court concluded that 
appellants had not established a prescriptive easement.3 A 
claimant of prescriptive easement must establish the necessary 
elements by clear and convincing evidence. Garmond v. Kinnev, 
91 N.M. 646, 579 P.2d 178, 178 (1978). Appellants not only had 
the burden of proof at trial, but on appeal are similarly 
required to marshall all evidence supporting the trial coin: t's 
findings and then to demonstrate that the evidence, when viewed 
most favorably to the trial court, is insufficient. Scharf v. 
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Appellants have 
not marshalled the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings in connection with the issue of prescriptive 
easement, it further follows that on appeal, appellants are 
required to marshall evidence which would support each element 
required to prove their claim of prescriptive easement. For 
example, the trial court found that appellants* predecessors :in 
interest worked for Silver King Coalition Mines Company, and 
were given permission by the company to build a house on the 
property in question. Appellants claim that this finding is 
not supported by the evidence but they do not provide other-
argument or reference to the trial record to establish that thp 
use was •'adverse," one of the required elements for 
prescriptive easement. Similarly, appellants have not compiled 
evidence which establishes the other necessary elements and 
have further failed to analyze what rights or claims to damages 
might flow from the alleged prescriptive easement. We will not 
consider conclusory arguments without citation to either the 
record or cases involving pivotal issues. Randall v. Salvation 
Army, 100 Nev. 466, 686 P.2d 241, 244 (1984). Therefore, we 
find that appellants did not 'establish a prescriptive easement 
to the property. 
Laches and Estoppel 
Finally, appellants assert that Park City is barred from 
claiming ownership of the property by laches and estoppel. 
Those issues were not raised in the trial court and, therefore, 
1. The court also concluded that the prescriptive easement 
claim was barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5 (1987). However, 
in Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the predecessor section to the present 
code does not apply to actions for prescriptive easements. 
811,1" I II ' ."i. 7 
we decline to reach them, fieje James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 
801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Affirmed. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VELMA MARCHANT, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PARK CITY, a Municipal 
corporation, JACK COPPEDGE, 
and the STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 7174 
The above case was tried, commencing May 6, 1987. The 
Court received evidence by way of testimony, exhibit, and stipula-
tion, and after hearing final arguments of counsel, took the 
matter under advisement. The Court has now reviewed the evidence 
and law in this matter, and renders its Memorandum Decision 
as follows: 
1. The defendants' title to the underlying property in 
question, even with the claimed Michigan Trust Company gap, 
is superior to the title line claimed by the plaintiffs. The 
defendants1 title is traceable to the patent of the United States 
Government. Plaintiffs' title is insufficient in description 
and continuity. The plaintiff does not have title to the underlying 
property. Plaintiffs1 title, if any, was to the house or improve-
ments on the underlying property. 
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2. The underlying property in question was owned by the 
mining company, who allowed certain miners to build houses on 
the said property. Summit County assessed taxes against the 
underlying property separately from against the improvements 
thereon. If the owner of the improvements (house) failed to 
pay taxes, legal process eventually led to a tax sale only as 
to that improvement. Anyone who purchased at the tax sale acquired 
only that property that had been so assessed and levied against. 
3. The various tax deeds did not give plaintiffs • predecessors 
more than they already had. 
4 • Plaintiffs' predecessors never paid taxes on the underlying 
property, but only on that which had been assessed against them, 
the improvements. 
5. The defendants' predecessors paid all assessed taxes 
on the underlying property. 
6. The plaintiffs1 predecessors did not obtain the underlying 
property by adverse possession, since they never paid taxes 
on the same, and did not hold the same adversely against the 
true owner who did pay taxes on the said property. 
7. The plaintiffs did not obtain the underlying property 
by adverse possession, since such cannot be had against a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah. In any case, they did not 
have possession for more than seven years before filing of the 
Complaint, they did not pay all assessed taxes on the property 
MARCHANT V. PARK CITY PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISTO, 
in question, and their claims are barred by the statute of limita-
tions. 
8. For more than seven years prior to the filing of the 
Complaint, the property in question was not possessed by plaintiffs, 
rather it was abandoned. It was empty and open. It was in 
a state of deterioration. Those rare visits claimed by defendant 
did not constitute possession. 
9. The tax deeds conveyed only the house and not the 
underlying property. 
10. Prescriptive easement is not applicable, inasmuch 
as it applies only to use, and not to title claims to the fee 
simple. 
11. The house which had been owned by plaintiffs' predecessors 
was removed or demolished by a third party, not a party to this 
legal action. Because the house was abandoned, open, and considered 
a nuisance, Park City demanded of owners to abate the same. 
On application for permit, Park City granted such permit allowing 
demolition of the house. Park City did not participate in de-
struction of the house, and cannot be liable thereof. 
12. The granting of a demolition permit by Park City to 
a contractor, based on proper application, does not impose liability 
on Park City if the permit was wrongfully obtained or the work 
therein unlawfully performed. 
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13. Plaintiffs make no claim against the State of Utah 
for removal or destruction of the house. 
14. Even if plaintiffs had established liability on a 
party hereto for destruction of the house in question, the evidence 
of such damage is insufficient for an award to be made. There 
was no evidence presented as to the value of this old building, 
and no finding could be made without gross speculation in regards 
thereto. 
15. Furthermore, the plaintiffs1 claims are barred by 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-1, et seq. 
No notices of claim were filed within one year after the claim 
arose as required by that Act. The plaintiffs were aware of 
the destroyed building prior to Labor Day 1981. No notice of 
claim was ever filed against the state of Utah. Notice of claim 
was filed against Park City on September 20, 1982, more than 
one year after the plaintiffs learned of the destruction of 
the building. The very latest the claim could arise was at 
that time. 
16. Title to the land in question is quieted in the defen-
dants (State of Utah). Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages 
against these defendants. 
Attorney for the defendant Park City will prepare the appro-
priate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, and 
MARCHANT V. PARK CITY 
PAGE FIVE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
submit the same to plaintiffs' ^ 
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VELMA MARCHANT, et al. ! 
Plaintiffs, 
v. ! 
PARK CITY, a municipal 
corporation, JACK ] 
COPPEDGE, and the STATE ] 
OF UTAH, ] 
Defendants. 
i FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 7174 
> Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
This matter came on regularly for Trial on May 6, 1987 
before the Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, District 
Judge presiding. The parties appeared through and were 
represented by their respective counsel, J, Craig Smith, 
Esq., Assistant City Attorney and James W. Carter, Esq., 
City Attorney for Defendant Park City Municipal Corporation, 
Alan Bachman, Esq., Assistant Attorney General for Defendant 
State of Utah and Robert Felton, Esq., for the Plaintiffs, 
Velma Marchant, Leora Robinson, Wanda Penrod, Mona Liechty 
and Merle R. Anderson, 
At the Trial the Court received evidence by way of 
testimony, exhibit and stipulation and heard argument by 
counsel representing the respective parties. 
Having given full consideration to all of the testimony 
heard and evidence admitted and having reviewed the legal 
memoranda and heard the oral argument, and now being 
appraised as to all and singularly the law and the facts of 
the matter, the Court herewith makes and enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The real property in question which was the 
subject of this action is described as follows: 
Beginning at a point which is North 407,38 feet West 
41,39 feet of the Southwest corner of the Southeast 
one-quarter of the Northeast one-quarter Section 16, 
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian thence North 36°40'9" West 71.46 feet; thence 
North 57°29f15" East 77.50 feet; thence South 18058'45M 
East 70.93 feet; thence South 55°6'25" West 55.77 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
2. The chain of title through which Defendant State 
of Utah claims title to the real property in question is 
traceable to the patent derived from the United States 
Government. 
3. The real property in question was previously owned 
by Silver King Coalition Mines Company. It was a common 
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practice for Silver King Coalition Mines Company to allow 
miners to construct houses on real property the Company 
owned, 
4. Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest worked for 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company and were permitted to 
construct a house on the real property in question, 
5. The underlying real property in question was 
assessed by Summit County separately from the house located 
thereon claimed by Plaintiffs. 
6. Defendant's predecessors in interest paid all real 
property taxes assessed against the underlying real property 
in question. 
7. Neither Plaintiffs nor their predecessors in 
interest paid any taxes on the underlying real property in 
question. 
8. Plaintiffs did not have possession of the real 
property in question for a period in excess of seven years 
prior to filing their complaint; it was abandoned, empty and 
open and in a state of deterioration and was rarely visited 
by Plaintiffs* 
9. The chain of title through which Plaintiffs claim 
title to the real property in question is discontinuous. 
10. The tax deeds through which Plaintiffs claim title 
were given by Summit County pursuant to unpaid tax 
delinquencies on the improvements located on the underlying 
real property in question. 
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11. The house which had been owned by Plaintiffs' 
predecessors was removed or demolished by a third party, not 
a party to this action. 
12. Because of the abandoned and deteriorated nature 
of the house on the property Park City granted a demolition 
permit for the demolition of the he use, on proper 
application, to a third party claiming ownership of the 
house. 
13. There was no evidence presented as to the value of 
the house and no finding as to the value can be made without 
gross speculation. 
14. Plaintiffs were aware of the destruction of the 
house prior to September 7, 1981. 
15. No notice of claim was ever filed by the 
Plaintiffs against Defendant State of Utah. 
16. Notice of claim was filed against Defendant Park 
City on September 20, 1982, more than one year after the 
Plaintiffs learned of the destruction of the house. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The chain of title through which the Defendant 
State of Utah claims title is superior to the chain of title 
through which Plaintiffs claim title. 
2. Plaintiffs' claim to title by deed to the 
underlying real property in question, fails due to 
insufficient descriptions in the claimed deeds and a lack 
of continuity of Plaintiffs' claimed chain of title. 
Plaintiffs' title, if any, was to the house or improvements 
located upon the real property in question. 
3- The tax deeds under which Plaintiffs claim title 
to the real property conveyed improvements only and had no 
effect on title to the underlying real property in question. 
4. The tax deeds under which Plaintiffs claim title 
to the underlying real property in question add nothing to 
the title of the Plaintiffs'. 
5. Adverse possession cannot be had against Defendant 
Park City, a political s .Ddivision of the State of Utah, or 
against Defendant State of Utah pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-12-13, 1953 as amended. 
6. Plaintiffs' claim of title to the real property in 
question by adverse possession and claim of easement by 
prescription are barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-5, 1953 
as amended. 
7. Plaintiffs' claim against the State of Utah is 
barred by Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-1, 
et. seq. 
8. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Park City 
Municipal Corporation are barred by Plaintiffs' failure to 
comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Annotated § 63-30-1, et. seq. 
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9, Plaintiffs' claim of adverse possession of the 
real property in question fails, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-12-12, 1953 as amended, for failing to show 
payment of all taxes which have been levied and assessed 
upon the real property in question according to law. 
10. Plaintiffs' claims of adverse possession of the 
real property in question and of prescriptive easement fail 
since possession by Plaintiffs1 predecessors in interest was 
not adverse to the interests of Defendants' predecessors in 
interest. 
11. Plaintiffs1 claim of prescriptive easement to the 
entire area of the real property in question fails as 
inapplicable to the facts of the case and concerns only use 
rather than possession of or title to real property. 
12. Defendant Park City is not liable to Plaintiffs 
for issuing a demolition permit, based on proper 
application, notwithstanding whether the permit was 
wrongfully obtained or the demolition work unlawfully 
performed. 
13. Plaintiffs have stated no claim against the State 
of Utah for the destruction of the house. 
14. Plaintiffs' complaint, and each cause thereof, 
should be dismissed with prejudice and title to the real 
property in question should be quieted in the State of Utah 
free and clear of any interest, lien, easement, or 
encumbrance by Plaintiffs. 
-6-
15. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any damages against 
Defendants. 
Wherefore, let judgment be entered in favor of the 
Defendants and against the Plaintiffs in accordance with 
these findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Dated this ktL day of June, 1987 
By the Court 
Leonard H. Russon 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Cz i^fe Stnith, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
ii'U^ LJU*— 
Bachman, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VELMA MARCHANT, et al. j 
Plaintiffs, ; 
v. ; 
PARK CITY, a municipal ; 
corporation, JACK ] 
COPPEDGE, and the STATE ] 
OF UTAH, : 
Defendants. ! 
i JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 7174 
i Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
This matter came regularly for Trial on May 6, 1987 
before the Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding, 
the Trial concluded on May 7, 1987, after all parties had 
fully presented all evidence and argued their respective 
positions. The parties appeared through, and were 
represented by, their respective counsel, J. Craig Smith, 
Esq., Assistant City Attorney, and James W. Carter, Esq., 
City Attorney, for Defendant Park City Municipal 
Corporation, Alan Bachman, Esq., Assistant Attorney General 
for Defendant State of Utah, and Robert Felton, Esq., for 
Plaintiffs, Velma Marchant, Leora Robinson, Wanda Penrod, 
Mona Liechty and Merle R. Anderson. 
Evidence was received in the form of testimony, exhibit 
and stipulation, oral argument on the facts and law were 
made by respective counsel and legal memoranda were 
submitted. 
Having given full consideration to the evidence 
admitted, the legal memoranda submitted, and the oral 
argument made, the Court having entered a Memorandum 
Decision and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law does hereby Order, Adjudge and Decree as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause thereof, is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Fee ownership of the real property in question, 
which is particularly described as: 
Beginning at a point which is North 407.38 feet West 
41.39 feet of the Southwest corner of the Southeast 
one-quarter of the Northeast one-quarter Section 16, 
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian thence North 36°40,9lf West 71.46 feet; thence 
North 57°29 ,15" East 77.50 feet; thence South 18°58 ,45 M 
East 70.93 feet; thence South 55*$%25" West 55.77 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
-<2-
i« qui«ed tn the State of Utah free of any interest. lie„, 
easement, or encumbrance of Plaintiffs. 
3. Each 
costs of court. 
party is to bear its 
own attorney's fees and 
V This is a final and appealable judgment 
DATED thl.jj_ day of 3 £ r r 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to Form: 
5/ Hcm.r F. Uyilk,nson 
Leonard H. Russon 
District Court Judge 
£L .] Craig^mi4 toraeV ftor Defendant 
Park City^Municipal Corporation 
Jan Bachman, Esq"! 






CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 




All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ART. I, §7 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be dcpnved of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
CHAPTER 12 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
78-12-5, Seizure or possession within seven years neces-
sary. 
No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall 
be maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or 
predecessor was seized or possessed of the property in question within seven 
years before the commencement of the action. 
78-12-7. Adverse possession — Possession presumed in 
owner. 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, 
the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have 
been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of 
the property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in 
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has been 
held and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the 
commencement of the action. 
78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession under writ-
ten instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person claim-
ing a title founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases: 
(1) where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(2) where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
(3) where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel, 
or of fencing timber, for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for 
the ordinary use of the occupant. 
(4) where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the 
portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not 
inclosed according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county 
is deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part 
improved and cultivated. 
78-12-10. Under claim not founded on written instrument 
or judgment. 
Where it appears that there has been an actual continued occupation of land 
under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a 
written instrument, judgment or decree, the land so actually occupied, and no 
other, is deemed to have been held adversely. 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
7g.l2-ll- What constitutes adverse possession not under 
written instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming 
title, not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only: 
(1) where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
(2) where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(3) where labor or money has been expended upon dams, canals, em-
bankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the purpose of irrigating such 
lands amounting to the sum of $5 per acre. 
78-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or ways. 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands 
held by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, desig-
nated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, 
or for any other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of 
time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such town or city or 
county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of, 
and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and 
that for more than seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser, 
his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous 
and adverse possession of such real estate; in which case an adverse title may 
be acquired. 
78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid. 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the 
provisions of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land 
has been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and 
that the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
